The definitive account of Stuxnet, read here as an operational case study: how attackers crossed an air gap, borrowed trusted credentials, and made a control room see normal.
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- Archives: Technical Controls
Fraud is often reported to rise in a downturn. Pressure goes up, headcount comes down, and controls that quietly depended on someone having spare time stop working. This weekend read sets out where exposure concentrates during a downturn and which defenses actually hold: strong internal controls, systems that flag the patterns people miss, a crisis plan written before it is needed, and a culture in which raising an anomaly is not a career risk.
Phishing and pretexting work because they target people rather than systems — and the people they target most successfully are the ones with authority to move money or grant access. No amount of security spending closes a gap that opens when someone helpful is asked a plausible question. This piece covers the main forms these attacks take, what they cost, and the defenses that hold up in practice.